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TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
RETHINKING CORPORATE FIDUCIARY 
LAWS RELEVANCE TO CORPORATE 
DISCLOSURE 
Faith Stevelman Kahn· 
The claim of this Essay is twofold: first, that corporate fiduciary 
law has an important contribution to make to the regulation of 
corporate managers' participation in corporate reporting and 
disclosure, and, second, that the fundamental principles of corporate 
fiduciary law are brought into focus when the problem of managerial 
misrepresentation to shareholders is examined from this perspec-
tive. This reconsideration of the connection between corporate 
fiduciary law and corporate disclosure to shareholders has signifi-
cant implications for the teaching of the basic Corporations course, 1 
and most particularly its discussion of corporate fiduciary law's 
protection of shareholders' interests.2 In relation to the latter, the 
Essay contends that courts will not be able to take a laissez faire or 
highly formalistic approach to adjudicating shareholder claims of 
managerial mendacity without impairing the conceptual coherence 
and moral, aspirational force of corporate fiduciary law. The 
comments herein address the informational needs and rights of 
shareholders in publicly held corporations-the focus on governance 
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Professor of Law, New York 
Law School. I am indebted to Claire M. Dickerson, Carlin Meyer, Marleen A O'Connor, and 
Hillary Sale for their intellectual support in the development of this Essay, and to the 
participants in the University of Georgia's Teaching Corporate Law Conference and Charles 
O'Kelley, its organizer. 
I My understanding is that corporate disclosure to shareholders is addressed within the 
introductory Corporations or Business Associations course principally and frequently 
exclusively in relation to proxy voting in public corporations, as regulated by federal law. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 14,48 Stat. 88 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n 
(1994»; SEC Rule 14a·3. Shareholders' need for accurate corporate disclosure as the basis 
for exercising their other crucial governance right-their right to make informed choices vis-
a-vis holding or selling their shares-has received comparatively little attention within the 
basic course and the literature on corporate governance. 
2 This Essay is part of a broader inquiry I have undertaken regarding the relationship 
between corporate misrepresentation, corporate fiduciary law, and the rights of holders of 
corporate equity. 
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issues in publicly held firms being consistent with many but 
certainly not all of the introductory business law courses.3 
Historically, there has been substantial consensus surrounding 
the importance of fiduciary law within the basic Corporations 
course.4 In scrutinizing the concept of fiduciary care, the standard 
curriculum has employed the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,5 for 
example, as a vehicle for discussing directors' obligations to become 
properly informed about corporate affairs prior to making a decision 
for the firm.6 By reading cases like Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas 
& Electric Co.7 and corporate opportunity cases like Thorpe v. 
Cerbco,8 students have analyzed directors' and officers' fiduciary 
duty ofloyalty in relation to the problem of managerial self-dealing 
in corporate property.9 And in the takeover cases, students have 
3 See Robert B. Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study 
of Methods and Content, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 438 (1998) (giving survey results from professors 
who teach basic Corporations or Business Associations course). In regard to private firms, 
the inapplicability of the securities laws' affirmative disclosure mandate on the one hand, and 
the absence of an established trading market into which shareholders could readily sell their 
shares, on the other, means that the informational rights and interests of shareholders 
therein demand separate consideration. 
• Discussion offiduciary law has historically occupied a central place in the basic course, 
as well as in academic and professional discussions of corporate governance. See, e.g., LEWIS 
D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAw AND POLICY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 658 (4th ed. 
1998) ('Fiduciary duty is perhaps the most important concept in the Anglo-American law of 
corporations."). For scholarship elucidating the analytic underpinnings of fiduciary law as 
applied in the corporate area, see, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in 
Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997) (comparing doctrine of fiduciary loyalty to contract 
law doctrine); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. 
J. 879 (arguing that contract principles should not be applied to define law of fiduciary 
relations); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983) (discussing various 
fundamental aspects of fiduciary relations). 
5 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The case is featured in most of the major casebooks. 
Nevertheless, consistent with the dynamic, evolutionary nature of fiduciary law, one scholar 
has taken the iconoclastic position that the case is an "outlier" better omitted from the basic 
course. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REv. 477 
(2000). 
6 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. 
7 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918). 
8 No. 11,713, 1995 WL 478954 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9,1995). 
9 This focus on managerial self-dealing in corporate property is consistent with both the 
case law and mainstream corporate legal scholarship on corporate fiduciary loyalty. See, e.g., 
David Morris Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate 
Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 184, 184-85 (1979) (suggesting that corporate law doctrine 
prohibits wrongful use of corporate property by those controlling it). Former Chancellor 
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analyzed managers' duties of loyalty to shareholders in relation to 
such managers' efforts to retain corporate control, and thus their 
power and compensation, against the wishes, and potentially best 
interests, of the shareholders. 10 
At a deeper, more conceptual level, however, it becomes evident 
that the doctrines of fiduciary care and loyalty are both concerned 
fundamentally with directors' and officers' stewardship over their 
firms' information. These doctrines obligate managers to oversee the 
gathering, internal and public reporting and the "deployment" of 
corporate information consistent with their firms' and their share-
holders' best interests. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the conven-
tional focus within the duty of loyalty on "secret profit-taking" has 
privileged the concern for the material effects of managers' rent 
seeking, whereas the problematic effects of the secrecy or lack of 
transparency in such managerial conduct has, in itself, received less 
William Allen's decision in Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp. was thus remarkable in finding 
that directors owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to respect the sovereignty of shareholders' 
exercise of the franchise absent ~compellingjustification:' Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 
A.2d 651,661-63 (Del. Ch. 1988). Respect for shareholders' decisionmaking authority, as an 
aspect of managers' duties of loyalty to shareholders, is evident, also, in certain strands of 
Delaware's evolving case law on directors' fiduciary duty of "disclosure" or "complete candor," 
as analyzed in this Essay. For analyses of corporate fiduciary loyalty taking a more expansive 
approach, see, e.g., William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to 
Corporate Law's Duty ot Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 
1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425 (1993) 
(suggesting problems related to modern development of fiduciary doctrine); Marleen A. 
O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? Directors' Conflict-ot-Interest 
Transactions and the ALI's Principles ot Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 
(1993) (examining importance of moralistic language used in discussing fiduciary duty). 
lQ See, e.g., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721 A,2d 1281, 1283 
(Del. 1998) (finding redemption provision in shareholder rights plan invalid); Williams v. 
Geier, 671 A.2d 1.368, 1379 (Del. 1996) (holdmg that when stockholders are given all 
necessary information relevant to defensive recapitalization plan their vote is dispositive); 
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am'3rican General Corp., 651 A,2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (holding that when 
board's defensive action is within range of reasonableness, action will be evaluated under 
traditional business judgment rule); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVCNetwork, Inc., 
637 A,2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) (finding Revlon duties apply to transactions involving sales of 
control); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) 
(discussing circum~tances under which business judgment rule applies to corporate takeover 
decisionmaking); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,506A.2d 173,179 (Del. 
1985) (stating that duty of directors when company is being sold is to maximize company's 
value for stockholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A,2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(holding that board will enjoy protection of business judgment rule, in suits challenging 
propriety ofits takeover defenses, where directors demonstrate their good faith, reasonable 
investigation and proportionality of defenses). 
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consideration. Yet the latter concern is more fundamental than the 
former, of course, since without transparency there cannot be any 
meaningful accountability in management's conduct. 
Courts' and commentators' difficulty in articulating the compel-
ling, foundational principles of corporate fiduciary law-such as the 
norm of honesty in management's communications to shareholders 
as it affects shareholders' exercise of their corporate governance 
rights, as discussed herein-has left corporate fiduciary law 
vulnerable to criticism, erosion and, eventually, displacement. 
Indeed, even a superficial glance at the academic literature reveals 
that corporate legal scholars hold starkly divergent views about the 
significance of corporate fiduciary law,l1 about the appropriateness 
of the relatively laissez-faire way that it has been applied by the 
state courts,12 and the zealous manner in which it has been 
employed by shareholder litigants13 (and, more problematically, 
their lawyers).14 Corporate legal scholars' sustained approba-
11 Compare DeMott, supra note 4, at 879-80 (arguing that contract principles should not 
be applied to define law of fiduciary obligation) with Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, 
The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y. U. L. 
REV. 1045, 1064 (1991) (stating that incentive structure of fiduciary relations depends upon 
contract principles); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-
Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 2·3 (1985) (taking middle-ground position 
as to rules governing fiduciary obligations). 
12 Compare, e.g., Brudney, supra note 4, at 615 C'Possibly the dilution of fiduciary loyalty 
strictures in the context of corporate management responds to perceptions of lesser need 
(because of the restraining influence of market pressures and reputational concerns) and of 
larger net costs of over-prohibiting than in the cases of agency and trusts or partnership. But 
the perceptions of lesser need or greater cost are hard to justify." (citations omitted» with 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425 
(1993) (illustrating similarities between doctrine offiduciary duty and contract law doctrine). 
13 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370 (2000) (discussing problems with 
possible reforms of class action litigation); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under 
Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 891-901 (1999) (discussing indetermi-
nacy of corporate law); Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder 
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1734 (1994) (discussing incentives in shareholder suits). 
14 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff. 60 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (1997) (analogizing class action suits to qui tam suits); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation & Conflict Between 
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 512-13 (1994) (discussing need for increased 
cooperation in litigation); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role 
in Class Action & Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis & Recommendations for Reform, 
58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-27 (1991) (addressing special role of entrepreneurial attorney in class 
and derivative suits); Ralph K Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors and 
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tion of the operation of the capital markets and even the threat of 
corporate takeover as the principal mechanisms promoting manage-
rial discipline15 has put pressure on corporate fiduciary law-and 
those who teach it-to justify the costs involved in its enforcementI6 
and, thus, its continued centrality within discussions of corporate 
governance, including those taking place in the classroom. 
Nevertheless, although certain influential academic commenta-
tors have weighed in in favor of limiting the compass of corporate 
fiduciary law, and thus, presumably its significance within the 
Corporations curriculum, economic and technological changes 
described under the rubric of the "Information Age" are pushing in 
favor of fiduciary law's doctrinal expansion.17 Such developments 
are likely to accelerate the evolution of standards of fiduciary care, 
loyalty, and good faith 18 as these standards are applied to managers' 
Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 947 (1993) 
(arguing that legal system raises cost of capital and, thus, retards economic growth). 
15 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Just Say Never?' Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 511, 515 n.13 
(1997) ("[I]t is myopic to focus on the costs and benefits of particular hostile takeovers, even 
in the aggregate. The most important impact is systematic, the way that a credible threat of 
a hostile takeover ll~ads management to focus on capital market signals, which in turn leads 
firms to be highly adaptable to competitive market changes. Because there are no complete 
substitutes for hostile takeovers, shutting down that threat will also have systematic 
effects."). 
18 See supra Mte 14. 
17 These developments are likely to effect a steady, incremental elevation in what is 
expected of directors in terms of implementing information-gathering and reporting systems 
that are consistent with prevailing industry norms. In addition, advances in information 
technology are likely to affect the corporate opportunity doctrine (an aspect of fiduciary 
loyalty), as they raise problems regarding the ownership of information. 
18 Because managers' obligations to oversee and participate in internal and external 
reporting do not fit neatly into the standard analytic constructs of fiduciary "due care" or 
"loyalty," directors' "good faith" obligation appears to be expanding, or at least assuming a 
heightened presence within the judicial discourse, in response to this analytic challenge. See, 
e.g., Malone v. Brillcat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("The issue in this case is not whether 
Mercury's directors breached their duty of disclosure. It is whether they breached their more 
general fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by knowingly disseminating to the 
stockholders false information about the financial condition of the company."); In re Care mark 
Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) ~'[I]n my opinion, only a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists-will establish the 
lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability."). My own view is that it is 
analytically superior for courts and commentators to affirm that a norm of honesty applies 
to directors' public communications (as well as their dealings in corporate and shareholder 
property) as a matter of fiduciary loyalty doctrine, instead of searching for firm conceptual 
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oversight of the production, refinement, and presentation of data 
material to the firm. The production of high quality data and the 
ability to organize and present such data accurately and coherently 
to the relevant corporate decisionmakers is essential to promoting 
optimal decisionmaking and, thus, value creation in the firm's and 
its shareholders' best interests. 19 As advances in information 
technology both fuel and are fueled by increased globalization of 
trade and the capital markets,20 and as these developments in turn 
expose firms to heightened competition,21 corporate directors and 
officers will be called upon to oversee and employ increasingly 
sophisticated, comprehensive and accurate "information technology" 
systems22 capable of organizing and presenting the appropriate, 
ground in the notoriously murky world of "good faith." For discussion of the good faith 
standard and the definitional problems attendant thereto, see Claire Moore Dickerson, Cycles 
and Pendulums: Good Faith, Norms and the Commons, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 399 (1997); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1993). See also In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders 
Litig. [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)' 94,194 at 91,711 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 
1989) (discussing application of good faith in context of tender offer). 
19 In his opinion in Caremark, William Allen connected this directorial responsibility to 
oversee the production of information to the board's statutory monitoring responsibilities. 
Caremark Int'l, 698 A.2d at 970 C'Secondly, I note the elementary fact that relevant and 
timely information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board's supervisory and 
monitoring role under Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law."). 
20 An obvious example would be the potential combination of Great Britain's Vodafone 
Airtouch, PLC (currently the world's biggest mobile phone company) with Germany's 
Mannessman AG, a telecommunications and engineering company that currently represents 
that country's largest mobile phone company. If the proposed stock-swap succeeds, the 
combined company would have stakes or control in twenty· five countries, including the 
largest cellular phone markets in the United States. The proposed combination had been 
opposed by Mannesmann's chairman, most of its 130,000 employees, and German labor 
leaders and politicians, including German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The explosion of 
''E-commerce'' is also a relevant example. 
21 For an appropriately rich and modern view of the scope of corporate governance, and 
the financial forces influencing its evolution, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Shaping Force of 
Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473 (1997). To the extent 
that better governance contemplates professional corporate managers who are able to gather 
and decipher the appropriate capital market signals, the transition away from conventional 
stock exchanges to electronic ones may present interesting new challenges and opportunities. 
See, e.g., Greg Ip & Randall Smith, Tense Exchange: Big Board's Members Face Off on the 
Issue of Automated Trading, WAU. ST. J., Nov. 15, 1999, at Al (discussing chasm between 
brokerage firms and the New York Stock Exchange regarding automated trading). 
22 This trend is evident in the increasing prominence of the "ChiefInformation Officer" 
(or other person with such responsibility) within the ranks of senior executive officers. 
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accurate information to the relevant corporate decisionmakers.23 
Because, in addition to the board and the senior executive officers, 
shareholders must also be considered an important class of corpo-
rate decisionmakers,24 the corporate business affairs that managers 
will be responsible for monitoring will increasingly be regarded as 
encompassing its public disclosures to shareholders.25 
In fact, corporate directors and senior executive officers have 
already inherited increased responsibility, as a matter of fiduciary 
care, for ensuring that appropriate systems of information-gather-
ing and (internal and public) reporting operate within their firms. 
William Allen's now famous dicta in In re Care mark International, 
Inc. Derivative Litigation indicates that managers will be looked to, 
as a matter of fiduciary care, to administer appropriate, efficacious 
systems of internal information-gathering and reporting.26 In 
addition, Allen's acknowledgment in Caremark of directors' 
responsibilities for overseeing internal information-gathering and 
reporting systems has established a doctrinal and conceptual 
foundation, albeit retrospectively, for the Delaware Supreme Court's 
recognition of directors' obligations to monitor the integrity of their 
firms' public disclosures in the interest of shareholders, as was first 
articulated in the court's 1985 Van Gorkom decision.27 
2-1 This concern is reflected in the increased emphasis within the corporate governance 
literature on the proper composition and functioning of audit committees of the board of 
directors. E.g., Blue Ribbon Commission Report on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate 
Audit Committees (1999) (on file with author). 
2{ This asserticn is consistent with this Essay's argument that "actively staying put" (in 
addition to voting and selling) is a shareholder decision that substantially affects not only the 
individual shareholders in question but also the status of the firm. 
25 The expanded judicial recognition of shareholders' informational dependence on 
corporate press releases and disclosures made public through SEC filings (such as forms lO·Q, 
10·K, and 8·K), in addition to proxy disclosures and management's tender-offer-related 
disclosures on Schedule 14D-9, is reflected in microcosm in the transition from the chancery 
court's to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Malone v. Brincat, C.A. No. 15510 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). The Delaware Supreme 
Court wisely rejected the idea that a request for a shareholder action on the part of the board 
should be dispositive of whether the communication implicates shareholders' corporate 
governance rights, and thus directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders. Malone v. Brincat, 
722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998). 
26 In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
27 Smith v. V8.n Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889-893 (Del. 1985) (concluding directors 
breached fiduciary duty of candor by their failure to make true and correct disclosures of all 
information material to shareholders' vote on proposed merger). 
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There is indeed a seamlessness between directors' fiduciary care 
responsibility to oversee internal information-gathering and 
reporting systems, which provide information essential to the 
directors' monitoring of corporate business affairs, and their 
fiduciary obligations to oversee the quality of the firm's public 
reports in the interest of facilitating shareholders' ability to make 
decisions regarding their investments. Because information about 
material corporate business affairs-and the ability to represent it 
accurately and credibly to third parties-will continue to be a highly 
precious commercial asset,28 corporate fiduciary law will continue to 
evolve standards under the duty of care (and also the duties of 
loyalty and good faith,29 as discussed hereinafter) for managers' 
oversight of gathering and reporting this information in both the 
firm's and shareholders' best interests. 
A strong argument can be made, moreover, that the standards 
governing managers' responsibilities for overseeing their firms' 
internal control systems and public disclosures should continue to 
evolve through the process of equitable review. 30 The pace of 
technological and economic change, as such change affects norms of 
corporate transparency and managerial accountability to sharehold-
ers' is likely to exceed the regulatory capacity of comparatively rigid, 
rules-based systems. The continued development of sound but 
28 See, e.g., Carole Basri, Corporate Transparency: The Triple Bottom Line Audit, 
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1999 ("In the Information Age the old paradigm of developed and under· 
developed countries, the First World and Third World, no longer exists. In the era of rapid 
globalization of corporations and financial markets ... transparency has become the new 
dividing line."). 
29 The distinction between managers' good faith but negligent acts affecting reporting and 
disclosure and acts in bad faith or in knowing violation of the law will continue to be 
important in this area, as in other areas of corporate conduct. For example, charter 
exculpatory clauses, which may insulate directors from good faith but negligent disclosure 
deficiencies, would not protect directors from personal liability for disclosure deficiencies 
arising from bad faith or self interest. See Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, 650 A2d 
1270, 1272 (Del. 1994) (concluding directors of corporation did not breach their duty ofloyalty 
or act intentionally in bad faith and thus were exempted from liability due to charter 
exculpatory clause). 
30 For a discussion of the full board's responsibility (in contrast to the somewhat myopic 
focus on standards for audit committee performance) in overseeing the existence of 
appropriate and efficacious systems of internal control, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board 
of Directors and Internal Controls, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237 (1997). 
2000] CORPORATE FIDUCIARY LAW 513 
parochial rules-based systems, such as the securities laws31 and 
accounting and auditing rules,32 should neither supersede the 
importance nor displace the unique function of corporate fiduciary 
law in this area. The state courts (and especially the Delaware 
Court of Chancery), as opposed to federal regulatory agencies, or 
even private, professional organizations, are uniquely positioned to 
balance principle (i.e. accountability), context (the legal responsibili-
ties of the relevant corporate officials and the quantity and complex-
ity of the information/systems they oversee) and innovation (such as 
improved information technologies). These factors will affect the 
courts' evaluation of the steps corporate directors and officers are 
expected to take in satisfying their "due diligence" requirement, as 
a matter of corporate fiduciary law, for ensuring the accuracy of 
their firms' disclosures. Corporate fiduciary law should operate, 
optimally, as a supplement to such alternative, rules-based systems 
in reinforcing '''the big picture" in regard to shareholders' rightful 
expectations of candor, honesty and diligence in managers' adminis-
tration over disclosure. 
Fiduciary law has a distinctive contribution to make in the 
regulation of managers' participation in disclosure. In contrast to 
the securities laws' preoccupation with the integrity of "the market," 
corporate fiduciary law has focused on supporting the integrity of 
corporate managers as it affects their official behavior. Indeed, 
corporate fiduciary law has historically had the preeminent role in 
defining professional standards of conduct for corporate directors 
and officers vis a vis corporate shareholders. And in applying 
3\ Through administrative actions and the publication of corisent decrees, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has assumed a prescriptive role in the evolution of standards for 
directors' conduct ill administering corporate disclosure, but the appropriateness of the 
Commission's taking the lead in this area is open to question. E.g., Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Concerning the Conduct of 
Certain Former Officers and Directors ofW.R. Grace & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 39,157 
(CCH) § 85,963 (Sept. 30, 1997); Report of Investigation in the Matter of the Cooper 
Companies, Inc., As it Relates to the Conduct of Cooper's Board of Directors, Exchange Act 
Release No. 35,082 (Dec. 12, 1994); In re Caterpillar, Inc., Release No. 303, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 1991·1995 (CCH) ~ 73,830 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
32 For a discussion of the accounting and auditing literature on internal control and its 
relevance to corporate governance, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and 
Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 240-44 (1997); Report of the National Commission 
on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (1987) (on file with author). 
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corporate fiduciary law to individual cases, courts have not shied 
away from constructing such standards in terms of expressly 
personal and moral commitments on the directors' parts. In 
undertaking this work of paideia, corporate fiduciary law (and 
fiduciary law generally) has assumed some of the "valence" of the 
criminal law. Although it operates in the adjudication of individual, 
civil suits, corporate fiduciary law expressly acknowledges the value 
and fragility of trust as a form of social capital requisite to economic 
transacting. Thus, it has been the special role, the unique nature 
and function of corporate fiduciary law to speak expressly to the 
importance of supporting norms of managerial trustworthiness, and 
thus shareholders' ability to trust in such trustworthiness. 
As applied to corporate reporting, fiduciary law holds the 
potential to shift the paradigm, as interpreted by the relevant 
corporate actors themselves, away from the relevant technical 
formalisms (too frequently hawked by lawyers and accountants) to 
the more meaningful and trenchant question of whether they would 
view the disclosure they are involved in crafting as being satisfacto-
rily candid and transparent ifit were their own capital at risk. This 
standards-based, more intuitive heuristic for managers' participa-
tion in the disclosure process supplies an important counter balance 
and complement to federal law's regulation of the precise timing and 
required topics of corporate disclosure. 
It should be noted at this juncture, furthermore, that acknowl-
edging the fiduciary dimensions of managers' participation in 
disclosure does not require altering the timing or substance of 
corporate reporting from that prescribed in the highly evolved, 
unitary federal system. The recognition of the fiduciary dimensions 
of corporate communications to shareholders does not require that 
shareholders' informational rights and managers' communicative 
obligations be regarded as absolute. To the contrary, the fiduciary 
values of managerial candor and corporate transparency must be 
reconciled with other, efficiency-driven values affecting corporate 
disclosure (including firms' need to keep certain information 
confidential), consistent with the law and also with firms' and 
shareholders' best interests. Nevertheless, adding fiduciary 
principles back to the disclosure mix holds the potential to reorient 
managers' mindset towards their participation in disclosure, 
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consistent with the aforesaid discussion, in a way that supports 
enhanced corporate transparency, and thus sustained high levels of 
equity investment in United States corporations.33 
From a more conventional perspective, corporate disclosure must 
be studied as an aspect of corporate governance because sharehold-
ers cannot exercise their governance rights-including their right to 
determine whether to hold or to sell their shares on an informed 
basis34-without adequate, accurate information about their firms' 
financial condition and material business affairs. This principle is 
axiomatic, and indeed self-evident as it relates to shareholder 
voting. The dysfunctionality of shareholders' rights to vote (which 
arise under state corporation law), without rights to receive 
adequate, accurate information (which are afforded public compa-
nies' shareholders by virtue of the federal proxy laws and regula-
tions) accounts, for why most basic courses, notwithstanding a nod 
33 See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL 
L. REV. 767 (2000) (arguing that well-developed schema of fiduciary role fundamentally 
influences judges' mindset in analyzing claims by trust beneficiaries). 
:It My interpretation of shareholders' hold/sell decisions as being a basic corporate 
governance right goes to the heart of my disagreement with the Delaware Court of Chancery's 
opinion in Malone. That opinion described shareholders' governance interests as being 
relevant to corporate disclosures only where directors have requested some form of 
shareholder response (that is, in relation to shareholder voting decisions, responses to 
management communications in regard to tender offer proposals, or in relation to sharehold-
ers' exercise of appraisal rights). It failed to include shareholders' ongoing investment 
decisionmaking-tht~ir right to determine on the basis of adequate, accurate information 
whether to hold (or even to sell) their shares-as an issue of corporate governance. 
Consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Malone, such a view of "corporate 
governance" is excessively constricted. See Malone v. Brincat, C.A. No. 15510, 1997 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 158 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), affd in part and rev~ in part, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). The 
chancery court opinion stated: 
In the realm of corporation law, this Court appropriately focuses on 
issues of internal corporate governance. One of our most important 
duties is "to protect the integrity of the processes through which 
shareholders exercise their corporate governance rights and 
responsibilities." When a board of directors elects or has a duty to 
seek shareholder action and discloses information in connection with 
the requested shareholder action, the board's actions implicate the 
fiduciary duties that attach to the disclosure. . .. When a share-
holder ii damaged merely as a result of the release of inaccurate 
information into the marketplace, unconnected with any Delaware 
corporate governance issue, that shareholder must seek a remedy 
under federal law. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
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to the concept of "rational shareholder apathy,"35 include a discus-
sion of the federal proXy regulations and the disclosures to share-
holders required thereunder.3s 
Nevertheless, consistent with Albert Hirschman's insights, it is 
apparent that shareholders protect their interests not only through 
their voting or "voice" rights, but also, and most crucially in the case 
of publicly traded corporations, through "exif'37-their right to 
determine on the basis of adequate, accurate information whether 
to hold or to sell their shares. The hold/sell decision should be 
acknowledged as a crucial corporate governance right and form of 
power that shareholders rightfully retain as principals within the 
corporate fiduciary enterprise. 
The elemental significance of shareholders' ongoing autonomy 
over their capital investment decisions is in no way compromised by 
the fact that shareholders have delegated administrative authority 
over their invested capital to the managers, consistent with the 
fiduciary nature of the enterprise, for the duration of their invest-
ment in the firm. Indeed, the ability of shareholders rationally to 
determine to "exit" the firm (or, relatedly, to determine rationally 
not to exit at any given time) is the principal corporate governance 
right that allows shareholders to be "safely passive" in regard to the 
management of their capital.38 The relatively nonprescriptive, non-
shareholder-protective nature of the states' corporation statutes 
as For a discussion of the problem of shareholder apathy in the context of voting. as it is 
affected by the proxy rules, see, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing 
Proxy Federal Regulation, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1129 (1993). For a more general discussion of the 
problem of collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1968). 
as Hillary A Sale, Of Corporate Suffrage, Social Responsibility, and Layered Law: 
Teaching Basic Business Law Through Federal Securities Law, 34 GA. L. REv. 809 (2000); 
Thompson, supra note 3. 
37 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LoYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
38 See William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 896 
(1997) ("Corporation law facilitates wealth creation principally by creating a legal structure 
that makes it substantially cheaper for investors to commit their capital to risky ventures. 
It does this through the innovation of tradeable share interests, centralized management, 
limited liability, and the entity concept itself. ... Much of this utility depends upon investors 
allowing themselves to be safely passive."). The innovation of tradeable share interests, of 
course, is not going to mean much if shareholders cannot rightly determine when it is in their 
interest to hold or to sell their shares. 
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reflects both the operation of the (relatively) more shareholder-
protective fiduciary laws and, even more significantly, the idea that 
in rationally choosing whether to hold or to sell their shares in the 
market, shareholders can "self-protect." Indeed, the open-ended 
nature of the states' enabling laws has been interpreted as being a 
direct outgrowth of shareholders' rational, self-interested, market-
based choices. Of course, these understandings are premised on the 
notion that shareholders will be supplied with the accurate 
corporate information they need to assess their self interest in terms 
of holding or selling their shares-and yet, problematically, this 
information is administered under the authority of rationally self-
interested corporate actors. The argument for robust enforcement 
of fiduciary standards in relation to managers' participation in 
disclosure is, on this basis, stronger than it is in relation to self-
dealing transactions, for example, where the market (in the absence 
of information-failure) may itself exert a prophylactic effect. In any 
case, the present system of corporation laws contemplates that the 
firm's managers obtain authority to determine what should be done 
with the capital shareholders have elected to invest within the firm 
(consistent with maximizing the corporate entity's and shareholders' 
financial interests)39_it does not properly afford managers sover-
eignty over the shareholders' ongoing investment decision itself.40 
In summary, shareholders' right to determine on an informed, 
rational basis whether to keep their capital invested in the firm or 
to divest it therefrom is a fundamental aspect of the corporation 
laws and corporate governance system that operate on behalf of 
shareholders in public companies, despite the fact that it has rarely 
39 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (noting that business 
corporation is organized primarily for profit of stockholders). 
~ See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564A.2d 651,663 ("The theory of our corporation law 
confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic 
masters."). The distinction is at the heart of the ongoing controversy surrounding corporate 
managers' ability to thwart shareholders from selling into high-value, non·coercive tender 
offer bids consistent with managers' obligation to be loyal to shareholders' interests. For an 
excellent discussion of the propriety of directors' attempts to thwart joint proxy contest/tender 
offers, see Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When 
is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 V AND. L. REV. 503 (1993). 
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expressly been discussed as such.41 From a normative perspective, 
the affirmation by courts of equity of shareholders' continued 
autonomy over their investment decision functions to reaffirm 
shareholders' status as principals within the corporate fiduciary 
relation, and thus to check the abuse of managerial power.42 From 
a positive and market-oriented perspective, shareholders' ability to 
choose, on the basis of adequate, accurate information, whether to 
hold or to sell their shares is the operative mechanism by which the 
capital and takeover markets promote managerial accountability 
and thus influence corporate governance for the better.43 
Proxy disclosures relevant to shareholder votes are, thus, only 
one variable in the informational equation of shareholders' rights 
and managerial power. Shareholders' decisionmaking regarding 
whether to retain their investment within the firm also is affected 
significantly by corporate disclosures publicized through periodic 
reports (SEC filings on forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K), corporate press 
releases, and the annual report to shareholders mandated by SEC 
Rule 14a-3. Shareholders rely on the full complement of official 
public disclosures made by publicly traded firms, and are affected 
by them, even where they omit a direct review of the relevant 
documents, since important new information disclosed therein is 
digested, analyzed and circulated by brokers, analysts and an 
~1 Commentators have discussed the importance of shareholders' "right to exit" the firm 
through a sale of their shares (as a response to unsatisfactory corporate performance) as a 
tool of managerial discipline (as it facilitates hostile tender offers and the ouster of under· 
performing managers). Nevertheless, besides noting that the "transferability" of corporate 
shares is a basic feature of the corporate form of organization, commentators and courts have 
generally failed to note that the right to make an informed hold/sell decision is an essential 
right of shareholders within corporation law. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that 
there is no convenient or accepted term for describing this "right." 
~2 Although the notion of shareholders' "autonomy" over their invested capital is under· 
examined within corporate fiduciary law, it may be understood to be a component of the "fair 
dealing" requirement that applies to freeze-out mergers, for example. See Emerald Partners 
v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223 (Del. 1999) (finding fact issue on element of fair dealing 
foreclosed dismissal); Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) 
(addressing fair dealing standard in relation to questions of candor and disclosure to 
shareholders) . 
.j3 For the argument that capital market signals facilitate the ability of corporate 
managers to promote corporate competitiveness, see Jeffery N.Gordon, The Shaping Force 
of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473, 1479 (1997). 
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expanded financial media operating through print, television, radio, 
and web-based formats.44 
Put simply, bad news travels fast, but corporate managers' 
disclosure of erroneous favorable information short-circuits this 
process. Without such accurate information, shareholders cannot 
seize the opportunity to exert informal pressure on existing 
management as a means of addressing their firms' problems. In 
terms of formal action, shareholders will not be motivated to install 
a new, potentially more dynamic, creative or competent board if they 
are being told that the firm's performance and prospects are "on 
target." And certainly, in many instances, shareholders might elect 
to sell their shares, in the attempt to minimize their losses, if 
information about diminished profitability or worsened prospects 
were disclosed. But even more universally, where managers' 
presentation of erroneously favorable information has deprived 
equity holders of their capacity for rational decisionmaking vis a vis 
their invested capital, such injury should be compensable, in at least 
nominal terms, independent of the attempt to quantify their 
damages, ex post, in relation to their stock's trading price at some 
earlier, hypothetical time of sale. 
Incorporating the discussion of shareholders' informational 
dependence upon corporate managers45 into the discussion of the 
44 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A Kornhauser, E/ficient Markets, Costly In/ormation, 
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787 (1985) (stating "the efficient market 
hypothesis should be imbedded in a general model that simultaneously explains both 
investors' decisions to acquire information and the process of market aggregation of 
information held by investors''). My understanding is that the process of investment 
information acquisition by various shareholder~ (e.g., individuals versus institutions) is 
under-observed within the basic course and even the literature on corporate governance, at 
least outside of the public offering context. 
015 The case lav. and commentary has thoroughly observed shareholders' dependence upon 
managers in relation to the maximization of the value of the capital that the shareholders 
have invested in the firm, but their informational dependence upon managers' good faith, 
diligent participation in the disclosure process has only recently begun to be observed in the 
fiduciary case law-most particularly, within Delaware's doctrine of directors' "disclosure" 
duties. My argument with this line of cases is that it has marginalized and triviaIized the 
question of honesty and candor in directors' communications to shareholders by unreflectively 
tying the resolution ofthe question of fiduciary laws relevance to corporate disclosure to the 
presence or absence of a request for a shareholder action. Rather than the formalism of the 
board's request far a shareholder action, it is shareholders' fundamental, systematic 
informational dependence on their firms' managers-in conjunction with their need for 
accurate information as a basis for exercising their corporate governance rights-that 
520 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:505 
agency costs with which corporation law is centrally concerned and 
focusing on managerial diligence, honesty and good faith in 
administering the disclosures material to shareholders as an 
important facet of corporate governance would, admittedly, involve 
a significant reorientation in the established boundary between 
state corporate and federal securities law-one that would have 
significant implications for the teaching of corporation law.46 
Because the federal securities laws and regulations define the 
reporting system operating in public companies,47 and because the 
federal securities laws have historically been of preeminent 
importance in defining private causes of action for investors seeking 
recovery for losses caused by corporate misrepresentation,48 the 
constitutes the basis for applying fiduciary principles to managers' participation in disclosure 
to shareholders. For the leading historical analysis of the (state law fiduciary) doctrine of 
directors' duty of "disclosure" or "candor," see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch 
Mob: the Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 V AND. L. REv. 1087 (1996). The 
delegation of broad, discretionary authority and the undertaking on the beneficiary's part of 
assumed dependence is a signal feature of fiduciary relations, of course. See Tamar Frankel, 
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 808-09 (1983) (describing "anatomy" of fiduciary 
relations). 
46 An examination of corporate disclosures made through press releases and periodic 
reports, and its implications for current shareholders and other market participants, could 
conveniently be integrated into the basic Corporations course after the discussion of the SEC's 
proxy regulations. For an integrated discussion of federal and state law approaches to 
disclosure, as they affect shareholders' interests, see LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORA-
TIONS, LAW AND POLICY 827-93 (4th ed. 1998) ('If fiduciary duties are one of the critical 
elements in the relationship between shareholders and management, it fairly may be said 
that disclosure lies at the heart of much of the law of fiduciary duties."). 
~7 See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 105-353 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17b, 77k, 77p, 
77q, 77v, 77z-1-77z-3 (1998» (defining disclosure responsibilities attendant to company's (or 
company affiliates') sale of securities}; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 105-366 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78ff(1994» (prescribing mandatory, periodic reporting, proxy 
related, and tender-offer related reporting for entities with publicly traded securities and 
certain others). 
46 For several decades, the bulk ofinvestor suits claiming informational fraud have been 
brought under section 10(b} of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder. (It is 
noteworthy that Rule lOb-5 is routinely described as "a judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
737 (1975». After the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, there was at 
least the perception that there were more widespread attempts to employ state securities law 
and common law fraud doctrines (as well as, most recently, fiduciary norms) as the bases for 
shareholder suits alleging losses arising from corporate fraud. Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 17k-I, 77z-1 to 
z-2, 78u-4 to u-5, 78j-1 (Supp. II 1996». This development was addressed by Congress in its 
enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
112 Stat. 3227. For commentary on the latter, see Richard W. Painter, Responding to A False 
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primary legal development and study of the problem of corporate 
(mis)disclosure has fallen outside the traditional boundary of state 
corporate law and thus the traditional curriculum of the basic 
Corporations course. 
Interestingly, this particular question-the proper domain of 
state corporate versus federal securities law in regulating corporate 
disclosure to shareholders-was addressed recently by the Delaware 
Court of Chancery and later the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Malone v Brincat.49 Malone involved a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty against the directors of Mercury Finance Corporation, a 
company traded on the New York Stock Exchange whose business 
focused on purchasing installment sales contracts on automobiles. 50 
The shareholders alleged that the company's directors knowingly 
overstated the firm's earnings and shareholders' equity in virtually 
all of the Securities and Exchange Commission filings and public 
reports made by the company over a four-year period.51 Although 
formally brought under the relatively recently recognized doctrine 
of directors' "fiduciary duty of disclosure,"52 the gravamen of the 
complaint was that the deliberate misrepresentation on the part of 
the directors as corporate fiduciaries constituted a more general, 
fundamental breach of their fiduciary obligations to their sharehold-
ers. The simplicity of the plaintiffs' claim was its genius: How could 
the directors lie to the shareholders, on the facts alleged, and yet be 
loyal to furthering their best interests?53 
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELLL. REV. 
1 (1998). The burdens and impediments faced by shareholder plaintiffs in pursuing causes 
of action under either federal securities or common-law fraud doctrines has thus substantially 
increased in the past several years. 
49 C.A. No. 15510, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30,1997), affd in part 
and rev'd in part, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
150 Complaint, Malone v. Brincat, C.A. No. 15510 (filed Feb. 4, 1997) C'The directors 
knowingly and intentionally breached their fiduciary duty of disclosure because the SEC 
filings made by the directors and every communication from the Company to the stockholders 
since 1994 was materially false."). 
61 Id. 
62 Id.; see also Malone, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *1 ("In this proposed class action, 
shareholder plaintiffs allege that director defendants breached their fiduciary duty of candor 
by reporting inaccurate year-end financial statements for several years."). 
113 This point was emphasized in the plaintiffs' briefs submitted to the Delaware Supreme 
Court in connection with the appeal of the Malone decision. See Plaintiffs Below-Appellants' 
Reply Brief at I, Malone (No. 459) C'The single narrow question here is whether plaintiffs' 
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Nevertheless, notwithstanding the compelling nature of the 
plaintiffs' claim, the chancery court held that the shareholders had 
failed to state a cause of action, and granted the defendants' motion 
to dismiss with prejudice. 54 The chancery court based its holding on 
its interpretation of Delaware's case law validating an express 
"request for shareholder action" as a prerequisite for the application 
of "directors' fiduciary duties of disclosure.,,55 In broad-sweeping 
language the chancery court opined that fiduciary obligations and 
matters of corporate governance were simply not implicated--even 
if the directors had made deliberate material misrepresentations in 
the relevant disclosures-since the complained-of disclosures 
contained no express request for a shareholder action. 56 But stare 
decisis was not, ultimately, the decisive factor dri\jng the court's 
opinion. Federal securities law, according to the court, not state 
corporate fiduciary law, provided the proper basis for allegedly 
complaint alleges facts that constitute an actionable claim for breach of the fiduciary duties 
ofloyalty and disclosure. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the individual defendants made 
repeated and intentional false statements in virtually every SEC filing and every communica· 
tion with their company's stockholders over a four year period."). For a controversial look at 
the limits of directors' duty to be candid and truthful in their public statements, see Jonathan 
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1990) (arguing that "firms should have the option 
of selecting an internal rule of corporate disclosure permitting them to make false statements 
in order to protect the value of corporate investments against ruination from premature 
disclosure"); see also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the 
Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991) (elucidating nature and extent of corporate disclosure 
obligation). 
54 Malone, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158, at *1 C'Director defendants, in a Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), contend that no duty to disclose arose under 
Delaware law because the directors did not release the financial statements in connection 
with a request for shareholder action. I agree and therefore grant the Motion to Dismiss, 
with prejudice."). 
55 Id. at *6 C'This court has stated on numerous occasions that, absent a request for 
shareholder action, no fiduciary duty of candor arises under Delaware law."). The court's 
allusion to the unsettled nature of the law (in terms of the absence of Supreme Court 
authority on the point) and the begrudging tone of the opinion suggest that stare decisis was 
not the decisive factor behind the court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss, however. 
See id. at *8 C'Neither the Delaware corporation code nor the common law suggests that 
Delaware can or should pick up the perceived regulatory slack when federal scrutiny may not 
include review of every actionable theory divinable by a dogged plaintiff."). 
56 Id. The outcome of the case was motivated by the court's excessively narrow, but not 
wholly unconventional, interpretation of the scope of corporate governance. As described 
herein, commentators have largely overlooked shareholders' need for accurate information 
as the basis of their making informed hold/sell decisions vis-a-vis their shares. 
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defrauded shareholders to seek redress for losses they had suffered 
as investors in Mercury Finance.57 However, consistent with the 
previous discussion of market-based corporate governance mecha-
nisms, such a distinct analytic separation between "the firm" and 
"the market" -with corporate law governing the former and 
securities law the latter-is overly formalistic and untenable. 
Moreover, as the chancery court in Malone also failed to discuss, 58 
the federal securities laws do not protect defrauded holders of 
corporate shares, or "nonsellers" in the language of securities law. 
Because the Blue Chip rule bars "nonsellers" from bringing a cause 
of action unde·r federal law, the plaintiffs in Malone could not have 
proceeded with a cause of action under Rule 1Ob_5.59 
Ultimately, it was the formalistic and excessively narrow 
parameters drawn around the definition of shareholders' corporate 
governance rights that invited the reversal of the chancery court's 
Malone decision. The definition of corporate governance employed 
by the court in Malone was simply unacceptably constrained. 
Knowing misrepresentation on the part of corporate managers of 
material corporate information that is foreseeably of importance to 
shareholders' voting and investment decisionmaking-particularly 
where such material misrepresentations present an erroneously 
favorable view of the firm's and, thus, the managers' own perfor-
mance-is as much an agency cost problem, and thus a proper 
subject of "corporate governance," as is managerial misappropriation 
of corporate property.60 As stated earlier, notwithstanding the 
67 ld. at *7-8. 
118 Strangely, the opmlon remarks that only federal law is applicable to the 
"misdisclosures" under consideration, while it acknowledges, at the same time, that federal 
law may not provide a cause of action to the plaintiffs at bar. ld. at *8 ("[F]ederal scrutiny 
may not include review of every actionable theory divinable by a dogged plaintiff."); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware at 6, Malone 
(No. 459) ("Mr Prickett: First of all, as to the federal law, generally it's buyers or sellers in 
this context, and we are not talking about buyers or sellers. The class I represent are people 
who just held stock in Mercury and didn't change their position. They didn't buy in, and they 
didn't buyout."). 
119 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
00 Michael C ... Tensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). As has been noted, 
"the 'agency cost' analysis still reigns supreme in the academic literature." Aleta G. 
Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 513, 515 (1993). 
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federal role in the disclosure area, state corporate fiduciary law has 
had the preeminent role in responding to the vulnerability of holders 
of corporate shares by promulgating broad-based, explicitly 
normative standards for managers' conduct of corporate affairs in 
the shareholders' best interests.61 And because shareholders' best 
interests include being accurately informed about corporate affairs 
so that they are afforded a basis for their rational decisionmaking, 
managers' fiduciary duties must be understood to apply to the full 
panoply of official corporate disclosures routinely made by public 
corporations. 
The Delaware Supreme Court's reversal of the chancery court's 
decision in Malone validates the idea that shareholders' informa-
tional needs, whether they relate to voting their shares or determin-
ing whether or not to continue to hold them, are core concerns of 
corporate fiduciary law and corporate governance that should 
occupy students' attention within the basic Corporations course. 
However, in light of the working premise that corporate investors 
are motivated chiefly by the objective of profit maximization, the 
academic and classroom discussion of the duty ofloyalty has focused 
on the problem of managerial self-dealing in corporate property.62 
Yet the concept of corporate fiduciary loyalty is surely broader than 
the prohibition on managerialexpropriation.63 And, moreover, while 
a commitment to facilitating shareholders' free decisionmaking vis 
a vis potential sales of control is reflected in the jurisprudence of 
target company managers' fiduciary duties, the conceptual basis of 
that fiduciary obligation has remained inchoate in the cases and 
commentary. If the ability to generate long term shareholder value 
is linked to the maintenance of social, cultural and moral values 
61 For discussion of the normative dimensions of corporate fiduciary law, see, e.g., Robert 
C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253 (1999); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 437 (1993); Marleen A. O'Connor, How Should We Talk About Fiduciary Duty? 
Directors' Conflict·of·lnterest Transactions and the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 954 (1993); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLAL. REv. 1009 (1997). 
62 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
63 See Brudney, supra note 4 (describing uniqueness of fiduciary (loyalty) standards in 
contrast to contract·based norms). 
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such as "loyalty," as social science research increasingly suggests, 
then students of corporation law may too frequently have been 
indoctrinated into an insufficiently developed conception of fiduciary 
loyalty. 
Corporate managers' duty of loyalty to shareholders does, of 
course, encompass a commitment to further the prescribed objec-
tives of the corporate fiduciary enterprise in the interest of the 
shareholders (i.e., corporate profit maximization, as traditionally 
defined). But managers' duties of loyalty to shareholders also 
encompass an obligation on the managers' part to respect the limits 
of the authority delegated to them (this is the conceptual basis of the 
prohibition on directors entrenching themselves in office, as it is 
enforced in the takeover cases).64 Finally, consistent with the focus 
in this Essay, as fiduciaries for their shareholders, corporate 
managers must respect and facilitate the forms of autonomy and 
authority that shareholders rightfully retain within the corporate 
fiduciary enterprise, as part of their duty to be loyal to the sharehold-
ers'interests. This principle is the basis of the fiduciary dimensions 
of managers' informational responsibilities as they affect sharehold-
ers' voting and investment decisionmaking. In fact, a glance beyond 
corporate fiduciary law suggests that an obligation to account and, 
a fortiori, to account honestly, for the outcome of the given fiduciary 
enterprise is endemic to the obligations that fiduciaries owe their 
beneficiaries.65 Thus, corporate managers owe an obligation of 
trustworthiness, candor and diligence in their oversight of disclo-
sure to their shareholders, consistent with their fiduciary loyalty 
obligation to respect shareholders' rational, free decisionmaking 
power. 
Therefore, in declaring that corporate managers violate basic 
fiduciary principles of loyalty and good faith if they deliberately 
publish material misrepresentations in public disclosures or direct 
communications to shareholders, and in allowing the Malone 
plaintiffs to replead their claim on this basis, the Delaware Supreme 
64 For reference to the relevant case law, see supra note 10. 
65 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 173 ("The Trustee is under a duty to the 
beneficiary to give him upon his request at reasonable times complete and accurate 
information as to the nature and amount of the trust property."). 
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Court "got it right." At least, in determining to hear the appeal en 
bane, the court appears to have realized the elemental significance 
of the issue before it.66 Rather than a narrow doctrinal question in 
the area of directors' so-called "duties of disclosure," it was the norm 
of managerial honesty within corporate fiduciary loyalty that was 
on the line in Malone. In simple terms, the Delaware Supreme 
Court's decision affirmed authoritatively that lying by corporate 
fiduciaries is "egregious,,:67 it injures not only the financial interests 
of the shareholders directly involved and the efficient operation of 
the securities markets, but also the storehouse of communal trust 
that is a prerequisite to corporate equity investment.68 
Yet, this Essay's endorsement of the Delaware Supreme Court's 
holding in the Malone case is subject to two major caveats. Most 
significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion indicates, 
indirectly, that shareholders proceeding with a cause of action for 
"fiduciary misrepresentation"69 will be required to prove their 
individual reliance on the allegedly false disclosures,70 in addition 
to other elements of the cause of action. Accordingly, if this aspect 
66 Transcript of Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, 
Malone v. Brincat, No. 459,1997, at 12 (Feb. 18, 1998) C'Chief Justice Veasey: Is this a case 
of first impression? ... Do you think we should go en banc to hear this case, or do you think 
this panel can decide it?"). 
67 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A2d 5, 8 (1998) C'[T]hese violations of fiduciary duty, which (if 
true) are egregious."); see also Norman E. Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate 
Gouernance in America, 52 Bus. LAw. 393, 406 (1997) CeIn the end the issue is integrity. 
Corporate governance depends on the integrity of directors and their counselors."). 
G8 There is an evolving literature on the importance of trust to economic interactions. 
See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary 
Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 547 (1993) (arguing for importance of trust in realm of 
competitive corporate contracting); Oliver Williamson, Calculatiueness, Trust, and Economic 
Organization, 36 J. L. & ECON. 453 (1993) (elucidating notion of trust as relevant to economic 
transacting). 
69 The coinage is my own. 
70 Malone, 722 A2d at 23. Rather than addressing the question of proof of individual 
reliance head on, the court merely stated that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to 
replead as "a properly recognizable class consistent with Chancery Rule 23, and our decision 
in Gaffin." [d. at 14. The Gaffin case is cited in Malone for the principle that "a class action 
may not be maintained in a purely common law or equitable fraud case since individual 
questions oflaw or fact, particularly as to the element of justifiable reliance, will inevitably 
predominate over common questions oflaw or fact." [d. at 14 n.47; Gaffin v. Teledyne, Inc., 
611 A2d 467,474 (1996). My view is that the disposition of power within the corporate 
fiduciary relationship mandates an altered approach to the reliance requirement-one more 
favorable to the plaintiffs. 
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of Malone holds true in future decisions, such suits for fiduciary 
misrepresentation will generally be barred from proceeding as class 
actions. From the perspective of compensation, the possibility of 
consolidated individual actions of groups of defrauded institutional 
investors is, clearly, only a partial response to the problem of 
managerial misrepresentation 7l-one obviously unresponsive to the 
concerns of defrauded individual holders (who, it is important to 
recall, are unprotected by a federal cause of action and barred from 
pursuing state common-law fraud suits on a class basis).72 
Secondly, from the perspective of deterrence, Malone appears to 
represent a gamble on the Delaware Supreme Court's part that it 
can uphold the persuasive, paideutic function of corporate fiduciary 
law73 in a world of manager-friendly burdens of proof and limited 
economic sanctions. The Supreme Court's Malone decision states 
unequivocally that "shareholder constituents of a Delaware 
corporation are entitled to rely upon their elected directors to 
discharge their fiduciary duties at all times[;]'>74 and that "share-
holders are entitled to rely upon the truthfulness of all information 
disseminated to them by the directors they elect to manage the 
corporate enterprise."75 But one must be skeptical of the signifi-
cance of such an "entitlement" where shareholders who have 
suffered a loss while they continued to hold their securities in 
enforced ignorance of the true condition of the firm and have 
demonstrated the materiality of the misrepresentations made 
knowingly or in bad faith by their director-fiduciaries are neverthe-
71 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Disclosure Duties, New Law and New Issues, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 
1999, at 5 ("In the ·=ase of false statements not intended to secure or induce shareholder 
action, the plaintiff would need to prove reliance, causation, and damages in addition to 
materiality. But it is possible to imagine a consortium of large investors, particularly 
including angry institutional investors, who might file such actions on a consolidated basis, 
possibly sharing a common counsel."). 
72 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227. 
73 "Paideutic" is the adjectival form preferred by Werner Jaeger. WERNER JAEGER, 
PAIDElA (1944). But "paideic" is also used. For the latter, see Robert Cover, Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 25 (1983) (describing Bible as the "paideic center of the 
interpretive traditions that grew from it"). 7. Malone, 722 A2d at 10 (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 
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less denied a recovery absent their proof of individual reliance upon 
the misrepresentations. 
It is far from clear that corporate fiduciary law can continue to 
communicate the gravity of the norm of managerial honesty that 
inheres therein or to support the trust of investors that assumes the 
operation of such honesty-especially once the question of manage-
rial mendacity has been presented to corporate fiduciary law as 
na~edly as it was in Malone-while taking such a hard line on 
shareholders' burden for establishing a recovery. Surely some 
separation between standards of conduct and standards of review is 
acceptable, and even desirable,76 and there is no mistaking the 
difficulty of the damages question presented therein, but there is 
clearly a danger that the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in 
Malone will come to represent a kind of formalism or even judicial 
disingenuousness toward corporate fiduciary law that may ulti-
mately undermine respect for this body oflaw, and thus its efficacy. 
The Malone decisions thus provide a fruitful context for examin-
ing both corporate fiduciary law's unique role in articulating 
normative standards of professional conduct for corporate directors 
and senior executive officers and, also, for considering what it will 
mean to managers, shareholders, and our "information" -based 
society if state courts refuse to back the norm of honesty inherent 
within corporate fiduciary law with meaningful, realistically 
enforceable legal sanctions. 
76 Eisenberg, supra note 18; see also James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Sharelwlder 
Suits, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 3 (1999) (arguing for reforms designed to underscore deterrence-
related, socially significant features of shareholder suits, including requiring appropriate, 
individual corporate actors to pay portion of judgment or settlement awarded). 
